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The I Jtah Coi irt of Appeals has jurisdiction over Wife/Appellant's ("Wife") appeal
pursuant to Utal i Code Ann. § 5 8-2a • 3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
BY APPFT.T 4 NT
Pursuant to I J R. App. P. 24(b)(1) Husband /Appellee ("Husband") contests certain
of wife's statement of issues presented forreviev
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In reviewing whether the trial court complied with this Court's ruling on remand, the
standard of appellate review of a trial court's alimony determination is also "clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211. This Court will not overturn an
alimony determination as long as the lower court supports its ruling with adequate findings
and exercises its discretion according to the standards set by this Court. See Willey v. Willey,
866 P. 2d 547, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY
OR REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Applicable is the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (a) as set forth by this
Court in its July 7,2000 Memorandum Decision. This statute is in substantial part the same
as the statute set forth by Wife in her brief at pages 2-3, with the addition of the following
factors under Subsection (a):
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the
payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
There are no other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of or of central importance to any issue in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of The Case, Course of Proceedings And Disposition Below.
Husband disagrees with certain of Wife's assertions in section A of her "Statement

of the Case." To the extent Wife has misrepresented facts and proceedings to this Court in
2

her Statement of the Case, Husband so states hereafter. In all other respects Husband agrees
with Wife's Statement of the Case.
This Court in its July 7, 2000 Memorandum Decision ("Jensen Appeal I") did not
determine that marital property was excludedfromthe marital estate. See Briefof Appellant,
pp. 3-4 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "App.'s Brief). This Court affirmed the trial
court's characterization of property as either separate or marital property, and affirmed the
trial court's award to Husband of all of his separate non-marital property. R. 359-60.
This Court in Jensen Appeal I very specifically reversed only the trial court's division
of the marital estate and alimony award, and remanded "for consideration of these two
awards under the proper legal standards and procedures." R. 361. (emphasis added).
Therefore, the only two issues before the trial court on remand were the division of the
predetermined marital estate and whether, after dividing the marital estate under Burt, Wife
was entitled to alimony. R. 360-61.
Wife's descent into the realm of convoluted misstatements of fact becomes glaringly
apparent as the trial court did not, contrary to Wife's assertion, characterize any "property
acknowledged to be marital property" as Husband's separate property, nor did it find, as
claimed by Wife, such to be "one of the reasons the court awarded more than half of the
remaining diminished 'marital' estate to Wife." SeeApp. 's Brief p. 4. In its Memorandum
Decision, Supplemental Decree of Divorce1 and Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the trial court went into painstaking detail and explained precisely why
it found all of Husband's separate non-marital property had maintained its identity as
separate property throughout the marriage, and that such property had never been
1

The parties were divorced pursuant to a bifurcation and Decree of Divorce
entered on or about June 22,1998. R. 219.
3

commingled, augmented by Wife, or become a part of the marital estate.2 R. 199-212; 221 37; 241-46. There was, therefore, no "marital property to restore to the marital estate"
before dividing the marital estate. See App. 's Brief, p.4.
On remand following Jensen Appeal I, the trial court followed this Court's
instructions to the letter. In its Second Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Second
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court considered in detail
each of Wife's claimed "exceptional circumstances" and specifically found,
[the] various circumstances she deems to be exceptional, they do not singly or
in combination justify the division of the marital estate between the parties on
other than an equal basis. As such no exceptional circumstances exist which
would justify the division of the marital estate between the parties on other
than an equal basis.
R. 618; 639:26-28.
Further, the trial court specifically and unequivocally considered each of the "factors
and directions from the Utah Court of Appeals in this case and Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(7)(a)(i)-(iv) (1998) and the additional factors included in the revision of such statute in
1999," in determining Wife had no need for alimony. R. 620-24.
The trial court applied a reasonable rate of return to the parties' income producing
assets at 7.5 percent. The trial court's assumption of a reasonable rate of return was utilized
by both parties without objection or modification in their subsequent papers filed with the
trial court, thereby waiving any claim that the assumed rate of return was in error.3 R. 2642

The trial court did find that $25,000 contributed to the Moynier Ranch may have
come from marital assets. The trial court found, however, it was equally possible the
money came from separate inherited funds Husband's father left to each of his children at
the time he passed away. R. 201; 323:181-85; 325:16.
3

Husband acknowledges that Wife argued for a lower rate of return, 5.5 percent in
a post-trial brief. R. 162-63. However, Wife utilized the 7.5 percent rate of return in later
papers, and failed to appeal that issue in the Jensen Appeal I as set forth above.
4

65; 525-26; 639:1. Neither party appealed the 7.5 percent rate of return in Jensen Appeal I,
that issue was not before the trial court on remand and Wife did not object to the 7.5 percent
rate of return in the Second Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R.
358-61; 571-74; 609-12.
B.

Statement of Facts.
Husband supplements the Statement of Facts in Wife's brief for the purpose of

rectifying her omissions, to make necessary corrections and modifications, and to provide
the factual basis for the trial court's ruling and direction on remand.
Compellingly, most if not all of the erroneous statements contained in Wife's
Statement of Facts are conspicuously bereft of any citations to the Record. The obvious
explanation for Wife's failure to cite to the Record in support of her conclusory statements
is that there is simply no such support.
Facts Relating to Award of Separate Property to Husband4
1.

The District Court awarded Husband as his separate property, his partnership

interests in the three principal components of the Jensen family ranching business (T-N
Company, T-N Ranches and the Moynier Ranch) together with 58,352 shares of Zions Bank
stock. Husband initially received essentially all of this separate property by gift or
inheritancefromhis parents. See Supplemental Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw,
1 10, R. 223 (as to T-N Company); Id. at Tf 12, R. 223-227 (as to T-N Ranches, Moynier
Ranch and miscellaneous associated grazing permits, mineral interests and water rights).

4

Husband maintains his position that the issue of property division in its entirety
was not before the trial court on remand. However, Husband refers to specific citations
in the Record supporting the trial court's initial property characterization and that the
Court of Appeals relied upon in affirming the trial court's properly characterized marital
and separate property in Jensen Appeal I.
5

With respect to the ranching properties, the Court found that none of them "have ever been
titled in the names of spouses of any of TN Jensen's children nor have any of the spouses
[including Wife] ever been requested to pledge independent credit or support for the
ranching operations." Id. at ^ 13, R. 227.
2.

The trial court also found that the award to Husband of his separate property

was congruent with the intent of Husband's mother and father who donated substantially all
of the separate property to Husband and his siblings. R. 199.
3.

T-N Company Partnership. T-N Company, the operating entity of the Jensen

family ranching business, was owned at the time of trial by Husband and his two brothers.
There was some conflict in the evidence as to whether the brothers' respective shares were
equal thirds or held in some other proportion. The trial court made no attempt to resolve this
issue, as it had no need to do so with respect to the separate property awarded to Husband.
See Supplemental Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law, \ 8; R. 222; 323:148; 324:7778.
While both of his brothers worked full-time in the ranching operations as salaried
employees of T-N Company, Husband was engaged full-time in the practice of law and
worked on the ranch primarily on weekends, for which he received no compensation.
R. 323:35; 324:199-202. The undisputed evidence at trial and as found by the trial court is
Husband's testimony that he averaged "at least eleven, twelve hours a day" in the practice
of law, and that "if I wasn't tied up in my law practice, I typically tried to spend one day a
week in the farming-ranching side." R. 324:193-94.
The trial court found that Wife "went very infrequently to the [ranch] properties and
there was no evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the properties."
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 14, R. 227. Wife's testimony on

6

the subject was that during thefirstyear of the marriage, she was on the ranch "quite a few
weekends" or "whenever I could be" but that after their first child was bom, the summer
following the marriage, she was "stuck at home." R. 119; 323:36. In response to a question
as to how much time she had spent on the ranch over the entire 27-year course of the
marriage, she replied, "I have no idea." When given the opportunity to respond
affirmatively to the question, "[s]o you actually went out and worked on the ranch on a
regular basis?," she answered only that on "[cjertain occasions we went up." R. 323:120.
It was Husband's testimony that Wife did not work on the ranch at all during the
summer of 1971, while pregnant with her first child; that during the entire course of the
marriage her visits to the ranch properties could be counted on "ten fingers" and that those
visits were not working visits but social visits with friends. R. 324:196-98.
The ranch was a source of friction between Husband and Wife. She testified that he
spent too much time in the ranching operations; and he testified, "[s]he never supported me
in the ranching operations. . . . She didn't like me to be involved with it." R. 323:36;
324:198.
The trial court found that, "[w]hile the percentage ownership interests of the three
Jensen brothers according to the official records are not equal, it was clear from the
testimony that they each deemed their interest to be equal and that the Defendant claims only
a one-third interest regardless of what the official records may show or reflect." R. 222.
4.

T-N Company Note Payable to Malpaso. Wife's argument for treating T-N

Company as a marital asset relies in part on a possible loan transaction between T-N
Company and Malpaso Corporation.

7

The Record facts relating to that transaction are as follows: At some point, T-N
Company executed a promissory note in the amount of $85,033 payable to Malpaso
Corporation, an entity formed in 1972 by Husband and one of his brothers, in which Wife
held no interest. R. 174-75; 323:51; Exhibits D-13, D-35. The Record is completely silent
as to the nature of the transaction by which this obligation was created, nor does it identify
the source of the funds, if any, which were transferred by Malpaso to T-N Company.
Indeed, it is unclear whether the note reflected an actual transfer of funds or other value by
Malpaso to T-N Company. In response to questioning by the Court as to this note and others
executed by T-N company, Wife's expert, Dean Smith, testified as follows:
The Court: Well, that means these [payees of the notes] loaned their
money to T-N Company, and T-N . . . then owed the money back to them?
The Witness: That's true, but I don't think there was ever a cash
transaction
The Court: So these were notes carried on the books, for whatever
reason, and then were simply washed and forgotten?
The Witness: Correct.
R. 324:91-92. If actual funds or value were transferred, the Record contains no evidence
linking them to marital property. In any event, the $85,033 note was ultimately cancelled.
R. 324:51-2.
5.

T-N Company Notes Given bv T.N. Jensen to Wife. In connection with a tax-

plan for distribution of his estate prior to his death, T.N. Jensen assigned to Wife his interest
in three promissory notes payable to him by T-N Company in the amount of $10,000 each.

8

R. 325:87-8; cf. R. 324:219-20.5 Following T.N. Jensen's death in 1992, those notes were
cancelled. The related book entries credited the value of the cancelled notes to the equity
accounts of the T-N Company partners equally. R. 324:51-2. Wife's testimony on direct
examination by her counsel was vague at best as to the number and amount of the notes.
She had no knowledge of the transaction by which the notes were canceled and credited to
the partners' equity, nor any knowledge of the purposeful context of that transaction.
R. 323:84.
Wife's expert testified that no ownership interest resulted in T-N Company when the
notes were wiped off the books, to Wife or to any other party. R. 324:52-3; 324:77-8;
324:90-3.
A variety of other obligations of T-N Company were dealt with similarly upon the
death of T.N. Jensen. R. 324:51 -2; 324:90-2. There is no evidence that he assigned the T-N
Company notes to Wife for any purpose other than that of facilitating the maximum tax-free
disposition, year by year, of his estate. There is a total lack of any evidence in the Record
to suggest that the assignment of the notes and their subsequent cancellation was ever
intended by T.N. Jensen or his heirs, or understood by Wife, to vest in her any interest in TN Company.
6.

Proceeds of Sale of Zions Bank Stock Transferred to T-N Company. Wife

also relies on a transaction by which $65,000 in proceeds from the sale of 861 Zions Bank
shares nominally held in joint tenancy by Husband and Wife was transferred to T-N
Company. Wife fails to note, however, that these shares were not derived in whole or even

5

Documentary evidence of only one of those three gifts was offered at trial. See
Exhibit P-6.
9

in part from the 750 shares, acquired in January 1988 during the course of the marriage,
which were conceded by Husband and found by the trial court to be marital property and
divided equally. The 861 shares sold to provide funds for T-N Company, in contrast, had
the same pre-marital source as those which the Court awarded to Husband as his separate
property. R. 325:47-9; Exhibits D-20, D-21; see also Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions ofLaw,ffi[17, 19, R. 231.
7.

T-N Ranches Partnership. T-N Ranches was owned equally by Husband, his

two brothers, and his sister. R. 325:75. No interest in the T-N Ranches property was ever
held by any of the siblings' spouses, including Wife. R. 325:76. The properties which made
up T-N Ranches were acquired in 1962 by Husband's parents, T.N. Jensen and Bonnie
Jensen, and subsequently transferred directly to the Jensen siblings or entities in which they
held an interest. Exhibit D-39.
8.

Movnier Ranch Properties. The Moynier Ranch properties are held directly

in the names of Husband and his brothers. See Exhibits D-27, D-28. The Moynier Ranch
properties were purchased from the Moynier family for $827,675, $633,437 of which
represented credits for lands acquired by the three brothers from Husband's parents and
transferred to the Moynier family or sold and the proceeds used for the purchase. The
balance either had been paid by the brothers or was outstanding at the date of trial.
R. 323:142-44; 323:181-83; 325:56-61; Exhibits D-27, D-28, D-29, D-34. Husband's
testimony was undisputed that none of the consideration provided in the acquisition of the
Moynier Ranch properties was derived from marital property. R. 325:59.
Of the total purchase price of $827,675 for the Moynier Ranch properties, the
ultimate source of only $148,500 is unaccounted for in the Record. Husband testified that
10

the latter amount was paid by the Jensen brothers. R. 323:182; Exhibit D-29. There is no
documentary evidence or testimony linking Husband's share of the $148,500 to marital
funds in the amount of $25,000 or any other amount.6
Husband testified extensively at trial regarding each of his separate properties,
including the Moynier Ranch property. R. 325: 6-77. Husband testified he did not protest
the Utah County Assessor's valuation for tax purposes of the Utah County portion of the
Moynier Ranch property because, as Husband carefully explained, the Jensen brothers
enjoyed a tax advantage as the Moynier Ranch property was taxed as "green belt" land. R.
325:61-3.
9.

Ranching Operations Generally. Respecting the ranching business as a whole,

the testimony was undisputed that none of the siblings' spouses, including Wife, ever held
an interest of record, ever participated in the making of business decisions, ever signed any
document on behalf of the business, ever lent their credit to the business, or ever otherwise
participated in the ranching operations. See, e.g., R. 324:207-12, R. 325:66, 68, 70, 73, 76.
10.

Zions Bank Shares. In addition to the ranching properties, Husband held

shares of stock in Carbon-Emery Bank prior to the marriage which, subsequent to the merger
of that bank with Zions Bank in 1973, were converted into 2,126 shares of stock in Zions
Bank. R. 325:43; 325:48. At the time of trial these shares had, by virtue of stock splits and
dividend re-investments, less sales, grown to 58,352 shares. R. 325:44-5.
At Wife's request in 1985, Husband, who at that point held these Zions Bank shares
in his name only, caused all of the shares to be placed in the names of both Husband and
Wife in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. Husband's testimony precisely and
6

See supra note 2.
11

unquestionably directly supports the trial court's finding that Husband had no intent to vest
a present interest in the stock shares in Wife. This Court affirmed that finding in Jensen
Appeal! Husband testified:
Q. At the time that these changes were made, Mr. Jensen, did you
intend to give Mrs. Jensen a present interest in the Zions Bank Stock?
A. No.
R. 324:216.
The testimony of both Husband and Wife as to why he placed the Zions Bank shares
in joint tenancy is unwavering and consistent. He did so to satisfy Wife's desire that in the
event of his early death she would have immediate access to the shares. Wife's testimony
on direct examination by her own counsel as to why she asked Husband to place the stock
in joint tenancy was, "I just feel like isn't that what this marriage is all about. We're both
working in the same direction for the same ends." R. 323:64. But under cross-examination
by counsel for Husband the following exchange occurred:
Q. Do you recall in that conversation your telling him why you wanted
him to do that?
A. Well, because I felt like we are working for everything together. At
that particular time I felt like it was very important, because he was gone a lot.
And I said to Jim, "If something ever happened to you, you know I I wouldn't want to have to deal with it." And he felt that - I mean, he
reassured me and said, "It's something that I should have been done anyway."
Q. Do you recall specifically saying to him, "I'm very concerned, with
all of your travel, that if something happens to you - "
12

A. Yes. I was concerned with everything because at one point we
didn't even have a will.
R. 323:128. Husband recalled perhaps five occasions over several months during which
Wife asked him to put the Zions Bank shares in joint tenancy. R. 324:213-14. He testified
regarding these conversations as follows:
Q. Tell the Court, if you would, please, in substance what was said by
her and what was said by you in the course of these discussions?
A. She indicated to me that the stock was all in my name, and she was
concerned if something happened to me, and that I was traveling, and away
from home a lot, what would happen. To my stock.
Q. What [did] you respond?
A. I told her that she knew that we had joint wills, that if something
happened to me provisions were made to take care of her and the girls through
the probate of my will.
Q. Okay. Did the discussion continue or the discussions continue to
the point that changes in fact were made on the names on the respective stock
certificates?
A. That's correct.
Q. Will you tell us, please, why those changes were made?

A. Well, I just got tired of the discussion with her, and put her name on
the shares of stock.
R. 324:214-16. The trial court, on this issue, found as follows:
13

This change [to joint tenancy] was made according to the testimony of the
parties at a time when the Defendant was engaged in significant business
travel, and the change was made to avoid probate in the event of his untimely
death. There was no evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent with
respect to such exchange.
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, %\ 8; R. 236.
Facts Relating to Division of Marital Property
11.

Marital Property. At trial, the court valued the marital estate at $3,006,536.64,

awarding Wife an approximate two-thirds share valued at $2,004,736.16 and Husband the
approximate one-third remainder, valued at $1,001,800.48. R. 213-214. The trial court's
characterization of the property comprising the marital estate included all marital property,
and all separate property that had been commingled. There were no marital assets excised
from the marital estate. R. 199; 212-13.
The trial court acknowledged that: Wife would receive an enhanced share of the
marital estate by benefitting from the inclusion of commingled property in the division of
the marital estate. R. 199.
The sole basis for awarding the disproportionate amount to Wife was the trial court's
finding that "certain assets should not be divided equally between the parties even though
they were acquired during the course of the marriage and have been determined by the Court
to constitute in part, the martial [sic] estate." The court's declared purpose in so doing was
to "recognize that... the Defendant has had the benefit of premarital sissets that are now of
significant value." Supplemental Findings of Fact, f 36, R. 236; see also, Id.,ffif14, 16;
R. 227-29 (Monica Cove residence distributed to Wife free of associated mortgage
obligation to compensate Wife for Husband's absence on ranch business). The Record
contains no other finding in support of the disproportionate distribution of marital property.
14

Wife's Brief on Remand From Court of Appeals, specifically argues that "the
evidence received by this Court at trial contains all of the information necessary to make the
required findings of fact." R. 527. Wife further detailed approximately eighteen (18)
"exceptional circumstances" she claimed justified an unequal division of the marital estate.
R. 528-31.7
The trial court reviewed Wife's brief on remand (R. 639:1) and following Burt and
exercising its discretion, under applicable law, considered and found Wife's claimed
exceptional circumstances were not exceptional at all and were in fact compensated by
awarding her approximately $1,500,000.00 in marital assets essentially debt free. R. 618;
639:58. The marital assets awarded to Wife included substantial income producing assets,
i.e. 7,451 shares of Zions Bank stock valued between $350,000 and $450,000, proceeds
from the sale of the Monica Cove residence of approximately $200,000,8 and total incomeproducing assets of $939,557. R. 620.
To suggest that the trial court should have done more is without any foundation or
basis in fact or in law.
Facts Relating to Alimony
12.

The income-producing assets awarded to Wife were capable of generating

annual income of $85,110.84 or $7,092.57 per month. During trial, the court also found
that should Wife sell the Monica Cove residence and move to a home of value comparable
7

Had Wife wanted the trial court to take new evidence on remand she could have
so requested. She did not. In truth and in fact she strenuously argued that the trial court
should take no new evidence. R. 526-7
8

The Monica Cove residence actually sold for more than the value determined by
the trial court. However, Husband utilized the trial court's findings as set forth in
Statement of Fact f 12, infra. R. 639:40.
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to that occupied by Husband, the resulting difference of $200,000 "could earn an additional
$15,000 per year or $1,250 per month." Supplemental Findings ofFact, f 36, R. 326-27.
13.

Temporary Alimony. Inexplicably, Wife characterizes Husband's voluntary

payment of support during the pendency of their divorce as the payment of temporary
alimony. See App. 's Brief, p. 13. Wife fails to candidly and truthfully inform this Court that
the $6,000 Husband paid Wife voluntarily was for the support of Wife and their minor child
Jorja. R. 323:53-4; 323:100.
Wife filed a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause with the trial court claiming
Husband must either continue to pay the voluntary support payments he paid pendente lite
or continue to pay alimony as ordered by the trial court. R. 363-66; 373-77; 481-88. Wife
did not request the trial court either in her motion or at the hearing on remand, to determine
the validity of any claimed oral "agreement" between the parties regarding the temporary
payment of support before the trial occurred. R. 639.9
Husband filed a Motion for Affirmative Relief, and an opposition to Wife's Verified
Motion for Order to Show Cause, requesting an accounting and reimbursement for alimony
overages paid as a result of this Court's decision in the Jensen Appeal I reversing and
remanding, inter alia, the trial court's alimony award. R. 467-78.
During the pendency of the proceedings before trial, Wife did not make any motion
for temporary relief, nor did the parties enter into any stipulation agreement regarding the
payment of temporary alimony pending resolution of their divorce action. R. 578. The trial
court held no hearing, took no evidence, made no finding and entered no Order regarding
9

No hearing was held on Wife's Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause or
Husband's Motion for Temporary Relief as these matters were considered by the trial
court at the hearing on remand, March 8,2000. R. 639; 489-90; 520-21.
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temporary alimony to be paid to Wife by Husband during the pendency of the parties'
divorce action.
On March 8, 2001 the trial court considered the issues mandated by this Court at a
hearing on remand. R. 639. Following that hearing, finding no exceptional circumstances,
the trial court redistributed the parties' marital property equally, and thereafter found Wife
had no need for alimony. R. 639:58-61.10 Again, Wife failed to address or even request the
trial court to enter any orders related to temporary alimony, or to determine the validity of
any agreement for the payment of temporary support during the pendency of the parties'
divorce action. R. 578; 639. Subsequently, the trial court entered its Second Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Supplemental Decree of Divorce,
finding, inter alia, that Husband was entitled to repayment for the alimony paid from the
time of the trial until the reversal of the trial court's alimony award by this Court in the
Jensen Appeal I. R. 617-18; 622-23, 626.
14.

Standard ofLiving. Although Husband made certain that his children and

Wife did not "go without," Wife testified the parties did not "really do much traveling.
Without the kids. Everything was family trips, and we didn't do an awful lot. We did a few
big ones." Wife described those "big ones" as the family taking two trips over a twentyeight (28) year marriage: 1) a two week trip to Washington, D.C. in a motor home, and 2)
flying for a trip with the children to tour the New England states. R. 323:56-7. The parties
did not drive fancy cars, and did not buy new cars often. R. 323:58.

10

In sum, the trial Court followed exactly and specifically the mandate of this

Court.
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Wife did take a post-separation trip to Europe with her daughters, which was funded
by her father, not marital assets. R. 323:94
The parties only lived in the Monica Cove home in Salt Lake City for approximately
four (4) years of their twenty-eight (28) year marriage. R. 323:23.
15.

Wife's Needs and Expenses. At trial, Wife presented a schedule of anticipated

expenses totaling $8,572 per month, including $2,232 of residential mortgage expense and
$520 of high school tuition expense for their daughter Jorja, an eighteen year-old who was
in her senior year of high school. R. 323:59-60; Exhibit P-2. In the course of Wife's crossexamination, Husband's counsel established that the tuition and other school expense had
been paid by Husband for the balance of Jorja5 senior year (R. 323:107, 114); that Wife's
needs and expenses would be further reduced if she were not obligated on the first or second
mortgages on the Monica Cove home, that she was no longer obligated to pay the mortgage
or any other expenses associated with the Spring Glen home that had been sold and the
proceeds divided between the parties, and that certain other of the listed expenses were
exaggerated and inflated. See generally, R» 323:91-116. Following trial, but before the court
entered its findings, Wife presented the Court with an estimate of her "future need" of
$7,652 per month. See Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief, p. 17, R. 124.
During the pendency of the divorce proceeding Husband voluntarily paid to Wife as
support for her and the parties' then minor child Jorja $6,000 per month. The voluntary
payment was sufficient to pay the monthly mortgage payments of $2,207 on the Monica
Cove residence, a $700 per month payment on the Spring Glen home later sold and to
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provide for Jorja's needs, leaving a net amount for living expenses of $2,947 per month.11
R. 323:29-30; 323:100-01. Wife conceded, in effect, that the temporary support paid had
been sufficient for her needs and those of Jorja. Her testimony was:
Q . . . . Of the $6,000 you received and then we deducted these
[mortgage] payments, the balance of about $2,900 or $3,000 a month
was what you used to support yourself and Jorja?
A. Yes. That was gone in the rest of the utilities bills and gas
bills.
Q. Okay. But you didn't have any funds for the support of Jorja
other than those amounts for the last 18 months, have you?
A. No.
R. 323:101-02.
On remand Wife indicated her monthly needs and expenses approximated $7,652
($6,000 in unmet need) based on her claimed needs and expenses at the time of the trial,
when in fact her expenses were significantly less. R. 639:49. For example, Wife was no
longer financially responsible for any minor child, had sold the Monica Cove residence,12
and in any event was not responsible for the first or second mortgages. In short, Wife was
virtually debt free. R. 639:36-9.
The trial court meticulously applied each of the alimony factors to be considered
under the version of Utah Code in effect at trial and as detailed in Jensen Appeal I. R. 35911

The District Court awarded the Monica Cove residence to Wife but required
Husband to assume the mortgage obligations. See Supplemental Findings ofFact, f 37,
R. 235-36.
12

See supra note 8.
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61; 639: 39-45. The trial court found that Wife's living expenses and financial needs and
requirements, "after the deletion of voluntary contributions, the outstanding mortgages on
the Monica Cove residence previously sold and related property taxes thereon[,]
approximate $4,000 per month." R. 621.
While the trial court admittedly struggled with alimony, Wife's assertions to this
Court regarding that struggle are taken completely out of context. See Appellant's Brief,
p.31. The trial court did not find that the parties enjoyed an extravagant standard of living
but merely explained a hypothetical to the parties' in its statement in the Record at 639:44-6.
Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Wife could generate $5,872 monthly
from income producing marital assets awarded to her, that she could earn $893 monthly as
a minimum, if she chose to work, which she would not be ordered to do, and therefore, had
no unmet financial need at the time of the trial. The trial court reached this decision by
analyzing carefully and succinctly each of the applicable statutory factors. R. 639:39;
639:58-60; R. 620-22. These amounts resulted in expected income to Wife of $6,765
monthly, to meet her needs.13
16.

Wife's Earning Capacity. Although wife did not work outside the home while

the children were small, from 1985-1990 she was employed in Husband's law office in a
clerical capacity, performing word processing, filing and receptionist duties. Husband
testified that she was a "very good" employee. R. 324:195-97. Testimony was elicited that
Wife worked on a volunteer basis for a Catholic high school and in one instance authored
13

Wife claims that her total working assets after deletion of the $125,000 she was
ordered to repay as alimony overage, was $814,557. SeeApp. 's Brief p. 15 &nl. Even
assuming arguendo, that amount of income producing assets, Wife would generate
$5,090.98 monthly. Adding $893 of minimum wage earnings, Wife's total monthly
income would be $5,983.98. Again, Wife has no unmet financial need.
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a computer generated brochure for the school utilizing typing, graphics, and computer skills.
R. 324:197. Wife testified she had no present health problems that would prevent her from
obtaining employment, and that she qualified for part or full time employment as a
receptionist. R. 323:55; 323:87.
When asked at trial if she had sought employment since the parties' separation, Wife
responded, "No, I haven't, because my job isn't through with Jorja yet." R. 323:88. Wife
further testified that Jorja would be graduating high school in May of 1998. R. 323:88. Her
graduation was subsequently confirmed.
At the hearing on remand, Wife did not object to the use of the 7.5 percent rate of
return on income-producing assets. R. 639. Further, at the hearing on Wife's objections to
the Second Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, she objected in writing
only to the trial court's decision to award Husband a judgment for alimony paid. R. 571-75;
609-13; see also supra note 3. At that same hearing Wife argued that the transfer of Zions
Bank stock from Wife to Husband should be calculated using a present value of the stock.
R. 636:10-14. While she claimed that the Zions Bank stock only yielded a return of 2.2
percent, her claim was lacking in any proof. R. 636:2.
17.

Husband's Income and Expenses. There was some disagreement as to

Husband's disposable annual income. His own calculation, based on actual 1997 data, was
$11,893 per month [or 12 x $11,893 = $142,716 annually]. R. 324:229-37; 325:91; Exhibit
D-7. Husband's monthly expenses, net of alimony and child support, were $10,852.
R. 324:239-49; 325:91-2; Exhibit D-9.
The trial court determined Husband's income to be approximately $195,000 yearly.
See Supplemental Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, f 5; R. 220.
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Husband's ability to provide for Wife's needs, should any need exist, was not
disputed. R. 621.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Dissatisfied with this Court's denial of her appeal in the Jensen Appeal I, Wife filed
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. That Writ was summarily
denied. R. 480-80A. This Court's mandate to the trial court on remand in Jensen Appeal I
was crystal clear, divide the marital estate according to Burt, including the determination of
any "exceptional circumstances", and thereafter proceed to determine the viability of an
alimony award, if any. Notwithstanding that mandate, Wife in essence would like to start
over and have this Court preside over the divorce as if no trial had occurred. That is neither
the function nor the proper use of the Utah appellate court system.
The parade of horribles encompassing Wife's brief begins with the five issues she
states as the basis for her appeal. While three of those issues are properly before this Court,
the other two are not. Wife, however, does not confine herself to the five stated issues but
argues some ten issues on appeal within the body of her brief. Those issues are similarly not
properly before this Court. Only two issues were before the trial court on remand, i.e.,
division of the marital estate and alimony, Those are the only two issues before this Court
on appeal.
On remand, Wife argued that the trial court should take no new evidence. The trial
court agreed with her. Wife at no time during the trial or thereafter, until the filing of her
recent appellate brief, objected to the imputation of income to her as a minimum wage, as
to income producing assets, or otherwise. Wife continued to utilize the 7.5 percent rate of
return applied to the income producing marital assets. Wife objected to only one issue in
the Second Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the judgement awarded
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to Husband for alimony paid. Wife's appeal in this case reflects her attempt to re-litigate
everything including the proverbial "kitchen sink" and as such, is grossly in error.
This Court affirmed the trial court's characterization of separate and marital property.
Thus, the only issue before the trial court on remand was the division of the already
determined marital estate which it correctly divided on an equal basis.
The trial court followed Burt and found that no exceptional circumstances existed
justifying other than an equal division of the marital estate. Contrary to Wife's assertions,
Burke is not the bright-line test to determine "exceptional circumstances" and as such the
trial court made correct findings and did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on this issue.
See, generally Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). The trial court followed this
Court's mandate on remand and applying Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) found Wife
demonstrated no need for alimony. Thus, the trial court properly awarded no alimony.
Trial courts may properly consider investment income in determining a recipient
spouse's need for alimony, if any. The ability to generate income from income producing
assets bears directly on a recipient spouse's ability to meet financial needs. Thus, the trial
court correctly considered the income to Wife from the income producing assets she was
awarded in the division of the marital estate. That notwithstanding, Wife failed to preserve
this issue in the court below and is precluded from asserting this issue for the first time on
appeal.
Finally, when this Court reversed and remanded the trial court's award of alimony,
the case stood in the lower court as if no trial had been had on that issue in the first instance.
As such, the trial court correctly determined that Husband was entitled to a judgment for
alimony previously paid.
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This Court should adhere to and apply its decision in Jensen Appeal I, a decision that
if error were to be found would have been considered and decided by the Utah Supreme
Court. That Court denied Wife's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. This Court should affirm
the trial court's division of the marital estate and award of no alimony and dismiss Wife's
appeal outright.
ARGUMENT
I. WIFE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Wife's recitation of certain of the trial court's findings on remand and her blatant
attempt to reargue her case on appeal fall far short of meeting her burden to marshal the
evidence. That failure is not a minor "blip" on the radar screen of the appellate process, but
a nuclear missile which sinks her appeal. Accordingly, under well-settled Utah law, this
Court must assume the record supports the findings of the trial court.
A critical and fundamental requirement when challenging a trial court's findings of
fact is to marshal the evidence supporting those findings. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App
12, If 24.

The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel
must extricate himself or herselffromthe client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
'Id. (citations omitted). An appellant who merely reargues her position on appeal fails to
meet her duty and burden. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P. 2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). An appellant similarly fails to marshal the evidence on appeal when she merely
recites the findings on point and highlights the evidence she deems contrary to the findings.
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See Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P. 2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also Thomas v.
Thomas, 987 P. 2d 603, 606 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In the case subjudice, Wife does not assume the role of devil's advocate, but rather
that of the jilted petitioner listing a multitude of self-serving reasons she disagrees with the
trial court's findings. Wife's inability to extricate herselffromher own shoes and marshal
the evidence serves no purpose other than to divert the Court's attention from the only two
issues before the trial court on remand, i.e., division of the marital estate and alimony. Wife
has not presented in "comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [she] resists[,]" rather Wife fails in
certain instances to even recite thesefindingson the two issues remanded to the trial court.
Wife utterly fails to point in the record to the avalanche of evidence in support of the trial
court's decision to divide the marital estate equally and to award no alimony. Moreover,
Wife's arguments presented in her brief do nothing more than prove the fatal flaws in her
argument. Flaws recognized by the trial court to be contrary to fundamental principles
governing divorces.
Wife has no reluctance or hesitation to thoroughly recount her own unsupported
testimony and the testimony of her expert at the trial that Husband's separate property was
commingled with marital property and therefore, lost its identity as separate property. See
App. 's Brief, pp. 5-13. Her claim failed in the Jensen Appeal I and must fail now. Wife
declares to this Court that the trial court did not resolve the issue of values on Husband's
separate property, but refuses to acknowledge that when the trial court identified and
awarded separate property, under Burt mdMortensen, those values are irrelevant. See App. 's
Brief pp. 6-7. Wife gratuitously states the "trial court for the most part agreed with
Husband's characterization of the stock and ranch property as separate property." App. 's
Brief, p. 10. Wife, however, chooses to ignore over sixty (60) pages of testimony supporting
25

the characterization of Husband's property as separate, and over seven (7) pages of detailed
findings by the trial court on Husband's separate property. See Statement of Fact (SOF) ^[11.
Moreover, Wife asserts that the trial court on remand, rather than making detailed
findings in support of its original decision, changed its decision, and applied a dictionary
definition of "exceptional circumstances." See App. 's Brief, p. 12. Wife again, turns her
back on the Record evidence diametrically opposed to her argument to the trial court that
Burke is in essence the bright line test to determine exceptional circumstances. Wife's
statements also fly in the face of the trial court's exacting statements and findings that it
considered Wife's arguments, both in writing and at the hearing on remand, and found that
no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant other than an equal division of the marital
estate. SeeSOF,%ll.
On the issue of alimony, Wife merely regurgitates the reasons the trial court awarded
alimony in the first instance, and claims the trial court changed its mind on remand without
an evidentiary basis. See App. 's Brief pp. 14-16. Wife once again presents an incomplete
picture. Wife herself argued that the trial court should not take new evidence on remand as
the evidence presented at the trial in the first instance was sufficient. See supra note 7. The
truth is that the trial court made detailed findings on the issue of alimony and Wife had no
demonstrated unmet financial need. See SOF,ffif12,15.
Wife' s diversion into the validity of the trial court applying a reasonable rate of return
to income producing assets, is belied by the fact that she herself utilized that rate of return
in later papers filed with the court and did not specifically appeal that issue to this Court. See
supra page 5 8 n.3. Wife also fails even to engage in the "mere recitation" of the trial
court's Second Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with the exception
of the trial court's findings on Wife's ability to meet her needs. See App. 's Brief p. 14.
Wife utterly fails to assume her role as devil's advocate and candidly admit to the Court that
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the income producedfromWife's share of the marital estate met anyfinancialneed she had
to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during the parties' marriage. See SOF, ff 16.
Clearly, Wife has not met her burden to marshal the evidence on appeal. She did not
play "devil's advocate" and in fact she indefatigably continues to reargue not only her case
in its entirety, but highlights her arguments on appeal to this Court in Jensen Appeal I, which
this Court rejected. R. 358-61. Wife's position is the best example of "if first you don't
succeed...." Accordingly, Wife's failure to marshal the evidence renders this Court's task
to that of determining whether the trial court on remand followed its specific and mandate
directions. Once this Court determines the trial court fulfilled its mandate, the trial court's
findings of fact are presumed to be correct and its decision must be affirmed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED THE PARTIES' MARITAL
PROPERTY EQUALLY WHERE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST
TO DIVIDE THE PROPERTY OTHERWISE.
Both Husband and Wife made substantial contributions to the marriage: he in
working eleven (11) and twelve (12) hour days, five (5) and six (6) days a week at his law
practice and later as Vice-President and general counsel at Savage Industries to build the
parties' economic coffers and to provide the family with economic stability and a
commensurate standard of living; she by helping to run the household and raising the
parties' children. Together, over their twenty-eight (28) year marriage, the parties amassed
a marital estate approximating $3,000,000. The parties have been rewarded for each of
their contributions to the marriage by receiving one-half the estate they built together. Any
division other than on an equal basis does nothing more than devalue Husband's substantial
contribution to the marriage and penalize him for owning separate property. Such a result
is not and cannot be supported under any equitable or legal principle.
Contrary to Wife' s innuendos, Utah does not have a bright line test to determine what
constitutes "exceptional circumstances" sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
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marital estate must be divided on an equal basis. Although Wife argues the Burke factors,
which are considered in any property division, serve as such a bright line test, such is
absolutely not the case.
Husband concedes that no Utah case defines "exceptional circumstances" in the
context of divorce. However, several Utah cases provide trial courts with guidance in
determining whether and what exceptional circumstances may exist.

Perhaps most

instructive are the cases of Mortensen and Elman.
Wife argued in her brief that Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988)
allows a court to consider the award of separate property to one spouse when fashioning an
equitable division of the marital estate. Mortensen, however, holds directly to the contrary.
The Mortenson Court explained that although it may be appropriate in some instances to
award one party's separate property to the non-donee spouse, where the non-donee spouse
has somehow participated in the enhancement, augmentation, or protection of the
separate property,
in making [the division of the marital estate], the donee or heir spouse
should not lose the benefit of his or her gift or inheritance by the trial
court9s automatically or arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal
amount of the remaining property which was acquired by theirjoint efforts
to offset the gifts or inheritance. Any significant disparity in the division of
the remaining property should be based on an equitable rationale other than
on the sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or inheritances...
These rules will preserve and give effect to the right that married persons have
always had in this state to separately own and enjoy property. It also accords
with the normal intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts and
inheritances should be kept within their family and succession should not be
diverted because of divorce.
Id. at 305-08 (affirming property division based on the parties' stipulation that wife received
no interest in husband's retirement account, a clearly marital asset, in exchange for twothirds of estate that included certain stock in husband's separate family property) (emphasis
added).
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Thus, it defies reason and logic to try to understand how Wife can argue that the trial
court was correct in awarding her (and penalizing Husband) a disproportionately greater
portion of the marital estate. Awarding one spouse separate property, even significant
separate property simply cannot be an "exceptional circumstance" under applicable law. See
Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166,1168-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
This Court further opined on the types of "exceptional circumstances" that warrant
an unequal or disproportionate division of the marital estate in the very recent case ofElman
v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83. In so doing, this Court implicitly rejected Wife's claimed
exceptional circumstances.
In Elman, this Court determined that the trial court had appropriately awarded wife
an offset, i.e. a disproportionate share of the marital estate, for three years during the parties'
thirteen year marriage where wife's sole management of all of the parties' marital estate
freed husband to quit his lucrative job and work full-time to increase the value of his
partnerships all to the exclusion of any other work or contribution to the marriage. See id.
at f44. Thus wife's marital labor solely increased the value of the marital estate, and
husband's marital labor solely increased the value of his partnerships, his separate property.
See id. atffif8,20,26,29 (affirming lower court's determination that husband's partnership
interests were separate premarital property, not commingled, enhanced or protected by wife
in any meaningful way, but increased in value due to wife's sole care for marital estate
allowing husband to have no job and give sole and maximum efforts to his separate
property).
Pointedly, in Elman this Court specifically explained that the payment of a legitimate
business expense related to the value or use of an inherited or premarital assets does not
convert that asset or any portion thereof into a marital asset. See id. at |25 n.6. The facts
of Elman, i.e., the "exceptional circumstances" found there, were specifically and
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unequivocally distinguished from the types of exceptional circumstances claimed by Wife
in the instant case. This Court stated,
[w]e emphasize that this is not the normal circumstance where a spouse
reviews premarital stock holdings and makes investment decisions, devoting
a few hours to such management, while maintaining a normal occupation.
This situation involves the very unique facts as to Husband's time spent
managing premarital property and Wife's active efforts increasing the value
of the marital property.
Id. at ^[24 n.5 (emphasis added).
The Court in Elman, reviewed other cases Dunn14 distinguishing those cases based
on the non-donee spouse's augmentation of the donee spouse's separate property, and where
the non-donee spouse had an ongoing financial need that could not be met solely by
alimony. See id. atffl[22-29 (citingDunn v. Dunn, 802 P. 2d 1314-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(holding wife not entitled to any pre-marital contributions to or appreciation in husband's
retirement account)).
For example, the Elman Court explained that in Schaumberg15 the husband
augmented his separate property with marital funds thus changing the identity of the
property from separate to marital property, thereby justifying the lower court's award to the
wife of one-half the appreciation a building claimed to be husband's separate property. See
Schaumberg, 875 P. 2d at 603. The Elman Court was careful to note the distinguishing
factors,
we are not suggesting Husband's activities as an interest holder in the
partnerships, before he assumed active management of the partnerships after
his father's death, would convert the appreciation into a marital asset.

14

802 P. 2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

15

875 P. 2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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Id. at ^[25 n.6. Only when the husband made management of his separate assets his sole and
full-time job and Wife became the sole spouse to manage and grow the estate, did wife
become entitled to an enhanced share of the marital estate.16
Perhaps most compelling is the fact that the Elman Court did not rely on or cite to
Burke for the proposition that exceptional circumstances existed justifying an unequal
division of the marital estate. See id. atfflf28-29.
This Court in Hall v. Hall, 858 P. 2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) rejected wife's
claimed exceptional circumstances of lack of education, raising an autistic child and two
preschool aged children, finding these circumstances were properly dealt with in the court's
property and alimony awards. See id. at 1022-23.
In Walters v. Walters,11 the Court explained that where wife had a trailer on one piece
of husband's separate non-marital property, it may be appropriate on remand to exchange
one piece of separate property for marital property to allow her to remain on that separate
parcel. See id. at 68 n.4. However, the Court announced the exchange would be effected
such that husband still retained his separate property in its entirety and the marital estate
would be divided equally.
In Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239 the Court explained, "[exceptional
circumstances, memorialized in commendably detailed findings, justified departurefromthe
general rule that each party is entitled to fifty percent of the marital property" where the sale
of a marital home would have forced husband to move from the area and lose his
employment. See id. atfflf23-24.

16

The Elman Court goes on to cite other cases in support of the lower court's
decision. See id. at f 27. However, in those cases the courts found the wife had actively
participated in the augmentation of husband's separate property. See id.
17

812 P. 2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reversing and remanding property division
to follow property analysis).
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In stark contrast, no such exceptional circumstances were found in Finlayson v.
Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), where both spouses had the ability to support
themselves. The trial court's award of the predominant share of liquid assets to Husband
to permit him to discharge a debt was held to be error in the absence of findings sufficient
to establish a valid marital debt. See id, at 849.
These examples and principles guide the courts and counsel in the instant case.
Realizing that in its decision at the conclusion of trial, the sole basis for awarding Wife a
disproportionate share of the marital estate rested specifically on the award to Husband of
his separate property, the trial court in its well reasoned discretion determined,
I don't find that there are, consistent with what I think the Court of Appeals
had in mind as the basis for me to conclude that there were exceptional
circumstances.
R. 639:58. The trial court then proceeded,
The Court finds that while neither party has cited to the Court precedent
defining the terms "exceptional circumstances" in the context of justification
for an unequal division of the marital estate, clearly those terms include
deviation from the norm, higher than average, atypical, uncommon,
extraordinary, or similar meanings and concepts. The Court further finds that
while the Wife has detailed in her Memorandum various circumstances she
deems to be exceptional, they do not singly or in combination justify the
division of the marital estate between the parties on other than an equal basis.
As such, no exceptional circumstances exist which would justify the division
of the martial estate between the parties on other than an equal basis.
Second Supplemental Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, ^[1; R. 618.
Accordingly, the trial court was correct in its determination that anything other than
an equal division of the marital estate would work an inequity on Husband, who contributed
just as substantially to the augmentation of the marital estate as Wife. The trial court's
findings are further supported by the fact that Husband was merely an interest holder in his
family's ranching businesses and worked on the family ranch one day a week, if, and only
if, he did not have to work at his sole and primary job, his law practice and his later position
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at Savage Industries. While the efforts of both parties to the marriage are commendable,
they do not fall outside the presumptive rule of Burt
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY AS SEPARATE OR MARITAL WAS
NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND.
The trial court followed this Court's mandate on remand, to the letter. In Cummings
v. Cummings, 1999 UT App 356, this Court explained that on remand the trial court is only
to address issues specifically enumerated by the Court. See id, at^Hf 12-15 (leaving open for
further testimony and evidence only the issues of the value of retained earnings separate
from a business and the value of the business) {citing Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 909 P.
2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
Similarly, in the Jensen Appeal I, this Court mandated the trial court on remand to
consider under Burt,
the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed to
effect an equitable distribution in light of those circumstances and in
conformity with our decision. That having been done, the final step is to
consider whether, following appropriate division of the property, one party or
the other is entitled to alimony.
5wrt,799P.2datll72&n.l0. 18
Notwithstanding the fact that property division in its entirety was not before the trial
court on remand, the Record and the trial court's Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law explicitly supported the trial court's characterization of separate and
marital property and this Court's affirmance of that decision.
In the Jensen Appeal I, this Court affirmed the characterization of Zion's Bank stock
and the Ranch properties as Husband's separate property. R. 358-61.
At the hearing on remand the trial court specifically indicated to the parties that the
recharacterization of property was not before the court. R. 639:8-9. Wife did not object to

18

See also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
33

the trial court's decision not to re-examine and re-characterize property in its entirety at that
hearing.19 R. 639. Wife surely cannot resurrect claims on appeal to which no objection was
made at trial.
Wife's assertions that Husband was awarded marital property as separate property has
no support in the Record and must be dismissed on appeal. Wife claims that the trial court
awarded her a disproportionate share of the marital estate due to the trial court's award of
marital property to Husband as separate property. However, as Husband has demonstrated
supra, this claim is not only patently false, but also cannot serve as the basis to divide the
marital state on other than an equal basis.
Regardless of Wife's hue and cry to the contrary, the evidence was and is virtually
uncontradicted that Wife made no material contribution of time or effort to the ranching
business; neither the $85,000 T-N Company note to Malpaso nor the three $10,000 notes
gifted to Wife by Husband's father involved any commingling of marital property in the
ranching business; the $65,000 contributed by Husband to T-N Company represented
proceeds of the sale of Zions Bank shares which were the separate property of Husband;
fractional partnership interests in T-N Ranches given by Husband to his siblings were his
separate property, in which Wife held no interest; and no marital property or funds were
used by Husband to acquire the Moynier Ranch assets. See SOF,ffif1-10.
In accordance with the review of over one hundred (100) pages of testimony by both
parties and their experts, the trial court made exhaustive and detailedfindingsrelated to the
characterization of separate and marital property. See id. The trial court even-handedly

19

Wife cites to the Record pp. 524-40 and 571-75 in support of her claim that she
preserved the issue of property division in its entirety for appeal. Record pp. 524-40 is
Wife's Brief on Remand, which was submitted to the trial court before the hearing on
remand; Record pp. 571-75 are Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law and Decree and Memorandum in Support Thereof, which objected only to the award
to Husband of previously paid alimony.
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found in every instance where Husband's separate property had been commingled with
marital assets such that the asset lost its identity as separate property, the same was correctly
included in the marital estate, i.e. certain of the Zions Bank stock and the law office. R. 199214; 221-35.
In either case Wife's claim that the court failed to consider the issue of property
division in its entirety must fail. First and foremost, the only property issue before the trial
court on remand was the division of the previously determined marital estate. Equally
compelling is the Record evidence that supports the trial court's property characterization,
which is the same Record evidence on which the Court based its affirmance of the trial
court's decision in the Jensen Appeal I.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED WIFE HAD NO NEED FOR
ALIMONY FULLY SUPPORTING NO ALIMONY AWARD.
The trial court correctly determined that Wife could adequately meet her financial
needs, commensurate with the standard o"living she enjoyed during the marriage. Under
those circumstances, an award of alimony to Wife would be nothing short of a penalty on
Husband. As alimony is not to be punitive in nature, the trial court correctly made no
alimony award in this case.
It is axiomatic that "[t]rial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards."
Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
The general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge and to maintain to the extent possible the standard
of living enjoyed during the marriage.
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).
Alimony is thus remedial, rather than punitive.
At the hearing on remand, pursuant to the Court's direction in the Jensen Appeal I,
the court applied the facts of this case to Utah Code § 30-3-5(7) in effect in 1999. The
substance of Utah Code § 30-3-5(7) directs the court to look at the following factors,
35

The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor
spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) whether the
recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; (vi) whether
the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage.
Utah Code Ann. f 30-3-5(7)(a)(i)-(vii) (1997 & Supp. 1999).20
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where the income from the assets awarded
to the plaintiff is sufficient to maintain her in the manner to which she is accustomed without
periodic paymentsfromthe defendant," an award of substantial alimony is error. See Dubois
v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1973) (reducing alimony awared to $1 where wife
could meet needs equal to standard of living enjoyed during the marriage without periodic
payments from husband). Similarly, alimony was held not to be an appropriate means of
adjusting a disparity between the income of the parties where the wife to whom it was
awarded had "substantial accumulated wealth and monthly income" which permitted her "a
standard of living comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage." Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Furthermore, courts are entirely within their discretion to impute the federal minimum
wage as income to Wife, even though it would not require her to seek and obtain
employment. See Willey v. Willey, 866 P. 2d 547, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In the Jensen Appeal I, the Court mandated the trial court to first divide the marital
estate and determine whether any exceptional circumstances exist and thereafter proceed to
the alimony determination under the applicable statutory framework. R. 359-61. The trial
20

The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) is repeated in Wife's brief, however
the actual statute applied by the trial court encompassed not only the factors of the statute
in effect at the time of trial but additional factors. See supra, pp. See App. 's Brief, pp. 23. Wife did not request the trial court to consider alimony under Subsections (b) - (f).
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court detailed in its Second Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, each
of the statutory factors applicable to this case. See Second Supplemental Findings of Fact,
t t 5-6; R. 620-22.
Based on Wife's financial condition and needs submitted at the trial, the trial court
found Wife's needs to be approximately $4,000. See SOFy f 15.
Based on Wife's ability to meet those needs through income producing assets
awarded to her in the marital estate division, and through minimum wage earnings,21 the trial
court found Wife had the ability to generate approximately $6,765.22 See SOF, f 15.
The parties did not dispute Husband's ability to provide support to Wife, if
applicable. See S O. P , If 1 ;
The trial court found the parties' twenty-seven (27) year marriage although of long
duration could justify but did not require the payment of alimony. See R. 639:59.
Although the parties had one minor child at the time of their divorce and trial, there
was no dispute Jorja was in her senior year of high school at the time of trial and in fact did
graduate at the age of eighteen (18) with her high school graduating class. R. 639:59-60.
While Wile worked toi a brief period during the marriage at Husband's law office,
her employment was of short duration and Wife was fully compensated for her work. R.
639:60.
Both parties had attained the level of education they had at the time of trial by the
lime fftev » wrv married K O.W Mil"
The evidence at trial was crystal clear, Wife demonstrated no need for alimony.
I lu1 Itial i oinl atiiecth oernsed its diseietion und made each of the lequued findings In
21

The trial court determined Wife would not be forced to seek employment, but
that she could seek employment at least at the minimum wage, and in any event she could
likely meet her needs without the minimum wage imputation, R 639:59,
22

See supra note 3.
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justify the award of no alimony to Wife. Contrary to Wife's erroneous and unsupported
claim that the trial court erred in imputing investment income to her, Utah precedent holds
directly to the contrary. Although Wife now takes issue with the trial court's imputation of
a reasonable rate of return on her income producing assets, for the reasons set forth supra,
she did not preserve that issue on appeal, and in fact utilized that rate of return in papers she
filed with the trial court. Moreover, the trial court was entirely within its discretion to apply
a "reasonable" rate of return on the parties' income producing assets, and applied that rate
of return equally to Wife and to Husband.
It is quixotic indeed of Wife to allude to the argument that the trial court should have
equalized incomes. However, wife cannot, and in fact does not, dispute that she never raised
this issue or made this request specifically to the trial court.
Where Wife has no need for alimony and can maintain the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage from her imputed income and income producing assets, any
award of alimony would be punitive in nature to Husband which is strictly forbidden and
prohibited under Utah law.
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED HUSBAND A JUDGMENT FOR
ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY PAID.
Wife's contention that she is entitled to reinstatement of a fictitious temporary
alimony award subsequent to the decision in Jensen Appeal I is unsupported by the facts or
law and should be rejected.
The Court's decision in the Jensen Appeal I terminated Wife's right to receive
alimony from Husband. Once the trial court on remand determined Wife had no need and
therefore awarded no alimony, in fairness and equity Husband was entitled to a judgment
for all alimony previously paid from trial until the decision in Jensen Appeal I.
It is generally accepted and Utah courtsfollowthe precept that, the effect of
a general and unqualified reversal of a judgment, order, or decree is to nullify
it completely and to leave the case standing as if such judgment, order, or
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decree had never been rendered, except as restricted by the opinion of the
appellate court.
5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1950; Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P 2d 1244,
1248 (Utah 1979)(involving an equity action for specific performance of an option to
purchase realty); see also O'Brienv. O'Brien, 347 So. 2d 12hh, 12S9-()u (La. I I. App 1st
Cir. 1977).
Additionally, in Bailey-Allen Co ., I m • \ • K urzet, 945 P. 2d 180, 194 (I Jtah Ct ; \ f »j: »
1997), the court held "any portion of a judgment not appealed from continues in effect,
regardless of the reversal of other parts of the judgment." Id (deciding inter alia unjust
enrichment and contract chims)(citingD 'Aston v. Aston, 844 P. 2d 345,352 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)), Similarly, if those portions of a judgment, untouched by a higher court's i e\ ei sal
remain in effect, clearly the inverse is true, those portions of a judgment which are reversed
and remanded must, therefore, be i endered of i 10 foi ce oi effect < ib initit >
O'Brien v. O'Brien is also instructive. In O'Brien, the Louisiana Court of Appeals

So. 2d at 1290.
7I/7CH i\liu;u .i tin tl i mint .mauled alinunis .tiitl liuisllkiiid stu icssliillv letfuu il
the alimony award, but the court of appeals found the lower court reduced the alimony
awaid in inoi, the wile WJS nitillnl In flie ilillnriur tn Ilit1 undcrpdvnu'iil itotm the time of
the reduced alimony award until the court of appeals' reversal. See id. at 1290.
That court aptly reasoned,
[ijfthe Trial Court judgment would have increased alimony with the wife
receiving the increase until that judgment was reversed on appeal, the
husband after the reversal became final would be entitled to recover, in a
separate action, the overage paid the wife. The wife certainly could not argue
that the retroactive application of the reversal effected a suspensive appeal of
the Trial Court increase... Thus, we reason that the reversal by the Court of
the reduction of alimony places the parties in the same position as if no
reduction had ever been decreed, and the retroactive application of the
reversal does not operate as a suspensive appeal.
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IdP (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The situation is the same here. The effect of this Court's decision reversing the trial
court's award of alimony is as if the trial court's original award of alimony had never been
entered.
Prior to the trial in this case, there were no temporary orders in place. Accordingly,
there was no temporary alimony award for the trial court to resurrect pending the hearing on
remand. The only injustice and inequity would have resultedfromthe windfall to Wife had
the trial court not ordered repayment of previously paid alimony.
The amounts paid by Husband to Wife as and for alimony since the entry of the
Supplemental Divorce Decree are an "overage" for which the Husband is entitled to
reimbursement. See O'Brien, 341 So. 2d at 1290; see also Wasson v. Wasson, 439 So. 2d
1208, 1212 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983)(following reasoning in O'Brien and allowing
recovery of child support payments).
The Wasson court correctly reasoned,
[although the paying spouse was also expected to follow the trial court order
until the judgment became definitive, once the appellate court reversed the
trial and all delays had run, the effect of the appellate court's reversal was to
date back to the time of the original trial court judgment. Once the appellate
court determined the trial court erred in not awarding the higher amount of
alimony it was as though the trial court had ordered the husband to pay the
higher amount from the beginning.
Wasson, 439 So. 2d at 1211.
At no time did Wife ever request the trial court to take evidence or render its decision
on the enforceability of an oral agreement to pay temporary support. As such, Wife is
precluded from arguing this point for the first time on appeal.
23

The rationale behind the Louisiana law prohibiting suspensive appeals in
judgments relating to alimony is to prevent the wife from being deprived of
necessary support pending any appeal. See id. at 1289. Utah does not appear to
adopt a similar suspensive appeal law, however, the rationale is applicable here.
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More importantly, Wife is not being deprived of any necessary surpon In point ot
fact, the only party placed at a disadvantage in the instant case is Husband for paying out
thousands of dollars in previously awarded alimony specifically reversed and vacated b\ this
Court.
Husband is, accordingly entitled to recover all amount pnniotislv pan! HS ami (ot
alimony.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding Wife's flagrant and unending attempts to re-litigate the case in its
entirety to this Court in her second appeal, there are three issues property before this Court.
Whether the trial court followed this Court's mandate on remand from the Jensen Appeal
I regarding the division of the marital estate under Burt, considering whethei any exceptio 11 a 1
circumstances existed warranting other than an equal division of the marital estate, and the
issue of alimony. Whether Husband was entitled to repayment of overpaid alimony.
Notwithstanding Wife's ignoring of her basic obligation to marshal the evidence, the
trial court's decisions were reached by exercising the discretion iu wmui it

^ \

entitled.
Therefore, Wife's appeal should be dismissed in its entirety and the trial court's
decision affirmed in all respects.
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